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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WAGING WAR AGAINST PRIOR PAY: THE PAY STRUCTURE
THAT REENFORCES THE SYSTEMIC GENDER DISCRIMINATION
IN THE WORKPLACE
“I ask no favors for my sex . . . . All I ask of our brethren, is that they will take
their feet from off our necks, and permit us to stand upright.” 1

This quote from Sarah Grimke first circulated in 1837. 2 At the time, Ms.
Grimke aspired to pursue a legal career but was denied the opportunity because
her father did not believe she was capable of attaining the requisite level of
intellect; 3 nor would any law school have accepted her at that time regardless of
her aptitude. 4 She became a minister instead while she was forced to watch her
brothers pursue and achieve what was once her own dream. 5 Since 1837,
women’s rights have improved substantially. The Married Women’s Property
Acts, enacted in the middle of the nineteenth century, opened the door to a
measure of economic independence for married women. 6 In 1920, women
achieved the right to vote with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. 7 In
1963, in a second wave of feminism, the Equal Pay Act was first enacted, seen
by many as the key for providing women equal access to the workplace. 8
At the time of enactment, women were earning fifty-nine cents to the dollar. 9
Today, fifty-five years later, women still only earn eighty cents to the dollar. 10
This issue is especially relevant since a 2018 Equal Pay Survey found one in three
1. Sarah Grimké, Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Woman, Letter 2
(July
17, 1837), http://www.worldculture.org/articles/12-Grimke%20Letters,%201-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UEB4-9LFN].
2. Id.
3. Pamela R. Durso, Sarah Grimiké: A Useful Member of Society, MUTUALITY (2007),
https://www.cbeinternational.org/sites/default/files/sarah-grimke.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EJ6-5R
C8].
4. Barbara Joan Zeitz, CountHerHistory, AAUW-ILLINOIS (2009), https://aauw-il.aauw.net/
files/2013/04/Oct2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RFC-DFWZ].
5. See supra note 3.
6. See Leo Kanowitz, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 40–41 (1969).
7. U. S. CONST. amend. XIX.
8. Sally Ann Drucker, Betty Friedan: The Three Waves of Feminism, OHIO HUMANITIES,
http://www.ohiohumanities.org/betty-friedan-the-three-waves-of-feminism/ [https://perma.cc/Y4
QG-3LLS].
9. Equal Pay Act of 1963, NAT’L PARK SERV. (April 1, 2016), https://www.nps.gov/articles/
equal-pay-act.htm [https://perma.cc/D63E-9U4U].
10. AAUW, The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay Gap, https://aauw-il.aauw.net/files/2013
/04/Oct2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BDM-B2AC].
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Americans is not aware that a gender pay gap even exists—and men were found
almost twice as likely as women to believe it does not exist. 11 The study further
implicated that the gender pay gap begins as young as sixteen and continues to
develop and expand from there. 12 This indicates that women suffer wage
discrimination their entire working lives. By starting their careers at lower
salaries than their male equals, women face an uphill battle trying to level the
field. This is because when companies set a new starting salary, they frequently
rely on salary history inquiries, emboldening the differential pay disguised as
market place statistics. Factoring in this lower pay to establish a starting salary
simply perpetuates this intrinsic sex-based discrimination.
The fight for workplace equality for women has been long. In writing her
brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, the first case that recognized
sex-based discrimination, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg poignantly articulated:
In very recent years, a new appreciation of women’s place has been generated
in the United States. Activated by feminists of both sexes, courts and legislatures
have begun to recognize the claim of women to full membership in the class
“persons” entitled to due process guarantees of life and liberty and the equal
protection of the laws. But the distance to equal opportunity for women—in the
face of the pervasive social, cultural and legal roots of sex-based
discrimination—remains considerable. In the absence of a firm constitutional
foundation for equal treatment of men and women by the law, women seeking
to be judged on their individual merits will continue to encounter law-sanctioned
obstacles. 13

Almost fifty years since Reed v. Reed, the courts once again are confronted
with this realization under eerily similar circumstances. Yes, women can vote.
Yes, women can attend law school and pursue a legal career. Yes, women can
run a household without a man. But even with the passage of the Equal Pay Act,
can women truly have access to equal salaries when they face an uphill battle in
not only proving their capabilities and securing their spot at the table, but when
they are also regarded with implicit biases and an endemic history of earning
less than their male equal? 14 The answer, as the law is currently interpreted by
some circuit courts, is no. 15 Thus, it is essential for the U.S. Supreme Court to

11. Kerri Anne Renzulli, 46% of American men think the gender pay gap is ‘made up to serve
a political purpose,’ CNBC (April 4, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/04/46percent-ofamerican-men-think-the-gender-pay-gap-is-made-up.html [https://perma.cc/VB6A-B9RH].
12. Supra note 9.
13. Brief for Appellant at 10, Reed v. Reed, 401 U.S. 934 (1971) (No. 70-4), 1971 WL 133596.
14. Yaron Nilli, Better, but not good enough: Women still are few and far between on
corporate boards; JOURNAL SENTINEL (March 28, 2018), https://www.jsonline.com/story/opinion/
contributors/2018/03/28/diversity-lags-few-women-corporate-boards/430165002/ [https://perma.
cc/HLK2-444W].
15. Aubrey Menarndt, The Compounding Damage of Gender-Based Wage Inequality, PAC.
STANDARD (April 26, 2018), https://psmag.com/economics/the-compounding-danger-of-wage-
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step in to ensure this intrinsic and unintentionally unconstitutional practice
ceases to be perpetuated by employers.
With the recent Ninth Circuit decision, Rizo v. Yovino, courts have started
to make the direly needed progress to close this gap. The case addressed the
issue of whether an employer may rely on salary history when setting salaries,
when, as in Aileen Rizo’s specific case, the practice consistently results in lower
starting salaries for women even when factoring in education and experience. 16
The court sided with Ms. Rizo and determined employers cannot use prior pay
when setting salaries. 17 The Ninth Circuit’s decision to eliminate the use of prior
pay as a determination of starting salary can effectively narrow the gap by
removing a source of the income disparity, as women have historically received
less compensation in virtually all sectors of work.18 Due in part to lower starting
salaries for women and lower raises over time, considering a woman’s salary
history is inherently discriminatory, and thus is substantially responsible for the
current gender pay gap. 19 While salary history inquiries may not directly cause
the current gender pay gap, these inquiries help perpetuate it. 20 By utilizing a
salary history inquiry, employers rely on female workers’ lower past salaries as
a factor they consider as “other than sex” to base new, future salaries, but in doing
so continue to preserve the long-lasting pay inequity that exists between male
and female workers.21 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to take an official stance
on whether prior pay can be used to determine salary. The Supreme Court did,
however, recently have the opportunity to address the circuit split regarding the
consideration of prior pay when they elected to grant certiorari on Rizo v. Yovino.
However, their decision failed to even broach the issue. Instead, the court
recklessly remanded the decision for reasons unrelated to the central issue.
This Note addresses the inconsistent interpretations on whether prior pay can
in fact be considered a “factor other than sex” when analyzing the Equal Pay
Act. Based on the Equal Pay Act’s language, legislative history, and the
persistent gender pay gap seen today in the workplace, the Ninth Circuit was
correct to exclude prior pay as a “factor other than sex” due to the unintended
but consequential perpetuation of salary discrimination that is, in fact, on the

inequality [https://perma.cc/W8GD-49P9]. (“Experiencing early wage discrimination can set
women back again and again, as small-percentage raises prevent them from ever truly breaking the
cycle.”).
16. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 457–58 (9th Cir. 2018).
17. Id. at 458.
18. H. R. Rep. No. 2095, at 6 (2017).
19. See Motion of Amici Curiae Equal Rights Advocates et al. to File an Amici Curiae Brief
in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 13, Rizo v.
Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-15372), 2017 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 189, at
*23.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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basis of sex. Prior pay is in fact a violation of the Equal Pay Act. Part I of this
Note will discuss the history and legislative intent of the Equal Pay Act. Part II
will discuss the Ninth Circuit case, Rizo v. Yovino, which addressed the issue of
considering prior pay under the Equal Pay Act. Part III will discuss the current
circuit split surrounding whether prior pay can be considered as a “factor other
than sex” when determining salaries. Part IV will address the need for the U.S.
Supreme Court to officially take a stance on the issue and the potential results
now that the Supreme Court has remanded the Ninth Circuit case. Part V will
provide insight to the legislative action that could occur, successfully solving the
Equal Pay Act’s violation before the Court gets another chance.
I. THE NEED FOR THE EQUAL PAY ACT
A.

The History Preceding the Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act requires that employers pay women and men the same
salary for “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility.” 22 Following World War II, a serious and endemic
problem saturated the United States. Women had previously flooded the
workforce to essentially replace the men sent overseas to serve. 23 When the men
returned home following the war, many women found that they still wanted to
work and earn extra income for their families. 24 However, when the war ended,
an economic problem emerged. This problem consisted of a wage structure in
which men were paid more than women although their duties were the same. 25
Congress noted this disparity was unacceptable on the basis of economic as well
as on the basis of justice and fairness. 26 As a result, women turned down jobs
where they were most needed even when they had the requisite education,
training, and experience. 27 Additionally, women’s suppressed wages limited
their ability to “earn a living” and “support [their] families.” 28 Efforts began
shortly after the war to correct this inequity. The first legislative attempt to
require equal pay for women began in 1944 with H.R. Bill 5056 authored by

22. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
23. See Women and Work After World War II, PBS AM. EXPERIENCE, www.pbs.org/wgbh/
americanexperience/features/tupperware-work [https://perma.cc/T69E-E4WB] (last visited Feb.
11, 2019) (“[W]omen proved that they could do ‘men’s’ work, and do it well.”).
24. Id.
25. Corning Glass Works v. Brenner, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (quoting S. Rep. No. 176, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963)) “The wage structure of ‘many segments of American industry has been
based on an ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be paid
more than a woman even though his duties are the same.’”
26. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 88th Cong. 9213 (1963) (statement of Rep. Spark Matsunaga).
27. Id.
28. United States Must Play New Role at Worldwide Trade Talks, 88th Cong. Rec. 8916–17
(1963) (statement of Sen. Philip Hart).
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Congresswoman Winifred Stanley. 29 The Bill was sent to the Committee on
Labor for discussion; however, it failed to make any progress from there and
eventually languished. 30 Many attempts were made by Congresswoman
Winifred, but none were successful in amending the National Labor Relations
Act.
Congress finally passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963 in an effort to correct this
persistent pay disparity between men and women workers. 31 This twenty-year
gap was a direct result of the inability to draw up enough congressional support
before then, as the gender pay gap was not seen as a pressing matter until then.
This may have been a result of the lack of female advocates for women in
Congress, or potentially due to the previously conservative political agendas
before John F. Kennedy took office. Women in the workplace were still not seen
as common practice, and there was a misconception that the wages were serving
as supplemental income that was not necessarily needed by families. It was
important not to make drastic legal changes as “the Court should never be
influenced by the weather of the day but inevitably they will be influenced by
the climate of the era.” 32 Thus, it could be deduced that women’s rights, when it
came to salary, required a far greater social outcry before the matter received the
legislation it deserved.
The 1963 Equal Pay Act’s objective is “simple in principle: to require that
‘equal work will be rewarded by equal wages.’” 33 When John F. Kennedy signed
the Equal Pay Act into law, he stated, “Our economy today depends upon
women in the labor force. One out of three workers is a woman. Today, there
are almost 25 million women employed, and their number is rising faster than
the number of men in the labor force,” thus setting the stage for enforcement of
this Act. 34 Since more and more women entered the workplace each year, the
need for the Equal Pay Act became apparent. In addition, Congress was led by
who was seen as a drastically more liberal president than previously, John F.
Kennedy.

29. Equal Pay for Equal Work Bill, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES https://history.house.gov/House
Record/Detail/15032448840 [https://perma.cc/3UEJ-23QX] (Last visited on Feb. 11, 2019) (“Her
bill amended the National Labor Relations Act to make wage discrimination illegal on the basis of
the employee’s sex. Stanley’s remarks when introducing the bill were prescient: ‘It has often been
remarked that this is a ‘man’s world.’ The war and its far-reaching effects have provided the answer.
It’s ‘our world,’ and this battered old universe needs and will need the best brains and ability of
both men and women.’”).
30. Id.
31. Equal Pay Act, § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 88–38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
32. Transcript: Interview with Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, PRI INT’L (Sept.
16, 2013) https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-09-16/transcript-interview-supreme-court-justice-ruthbader-ginsburg [https://perma.cc/5MGA-TZZD].
33. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 195 (quoting S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963)).
34. See supra note 29.
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The Statute

The Equal Pay Act states, “No employer having employees subject to any
provisions of this section shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis
of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . .” 35 In
accordance with the Act, a plaintiff may recover damages if she demonstrates
she was paid less than a colleague of the opposite sex who performed equal
work. 36 To constitute equal work, a job requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility. 37
The Equal Pay Act does not require plaintiffs to provide proof of intentional
discrimination. 38 Rather, an employer becomes presumptively liable once the
plaintiff has established the existence of a pay gap in which he or she is paid less
than workers of the opposite sex. 39 The Equal Pay Act also establishes potential
affirmative defenses for employers who can prove that an otherwise illegal pay
gap is due to: (i) a seniority system; 40 (ii) a merit system; 41 (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; 42 or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex. 43
C. Any Other Factor Other Than Sex
The first three exceptions are relatively unambiguous, limited, objective
exceptions. The Act’s fourth exception—“a differential based on any other
factor other than sex”—is more general and, thus, open for interpretation and
exploitation. 44 Consequentially, this last exception has resulted in controversy
and various interpretations by the courts in the past decades. A woman charging
her employer with compensation discrimination under the Equal Pay Act would
have drastically different results depending on which circuit she resides. The
first three affirmative defenses call for a far simpler analysis due to the
35. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2016).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), (3).
37. Id.
38. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640 (2007).
39. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
40. Aaron Hotfelder, What Are the Exceptions to the Equal Pay Act?, LABOR & EMP’T,
https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/labor-employment-law/employment-discrimination/equalpay-act-exceptions-for-unequal-pay.html [https://perma.cc/L2PZ-DQTZ] (“One of the EPA
exceptions allows employers to use a seniority system that compensates employees based on years
of service. An employer may use a seniority system to pay longer-tenured employees more than
newer hires, even if this approach results in a wage disparity between the sexes.”).
41. Id. (“In a merit system, supervisors evaluate employees on a regular basis according to
predetermined objective measures, with exceptional performers receiving raises or bonuses.”).
42. Id. (“These systems reward employees based on the quality or quantity of work
produced.”).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
44. Id.
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established requirements that “employers must prove the existence of a system
with objective standards and must show that the system was applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.” 45
The “any factor other than sex” affirmative defense, however, is routinely
seen as a “catchall defense,” or, as Eisenberg phrased it, the “Any Reason Under
the Sun” defense. 46 By adding this fourth defense, Congress inserted a “broad
general exception” and “did not limit the exception to job-evaluation systems.” 47
Due to the vagueness and generalness of the fourth exception, employers favor
it and resultantly cite to the any other “factor other than sex” affirmative defense
more than the other three exceptions combined. 48
The expansive approach of the catchall defense can be seen in Dey v. Colt
Construction & Development Co., where the court described the “factor-otherthan-sex” defense as “a broad ‘catch-all’ exception [which] embraces an almost
limitless number of factors, so long as they do not involve sex.” 49 The factor
does not even need to “be ‘related to the requirements of the particular position
in question,’ nor must it even be business-related.” 50 The Seventh and Eighth
Circuits have proceeded to embrace Dey’s approach of giving deference to the
employer for their interpretation of the any other “factor other than sex” defense
and to their interpretation’s reasonableness or relation to the job and business at
issue. 51 For these courts, “the wisdom or reasonableness of the asserted defense”
is not relevant. 52 The Seventh Circuit expanded this when finding that the Equal
Pay Act “does not authorize federal courts to set their own standards of
‘acceptable’ business practices. The statute asks whether the employer has a
reason other than sex—not whether it has a ‘good’ reason. Congress has not
authorized federal judges to serve as personnel managers for America’s
employers.” 53
Employers argue that prior pay inquiries are permitted under the “any other
factor other than sex” exception because the question itself only focuses on prior
salary rather than sex. 54 They conclude the inquisition is gender neutral on its
face. In practice, however, employers’ reliance on salary history results in
45. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L.
REV. 17, 57 (2010) (“Courts have recognized that permitting a defense to pay disparities based on
assertions of ‘merit’ and ‘performance,’ ‘if not strictly construed against the employer, could easily
swallow the rule.’”).
46. Id.
47. Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1982).
48. Ellen M. Bowden, Closing the Pay Gap: Redefining the Equal Pay Act’s Fourth
Affirmative Defense, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS., 225, 233 (1994).
49. Dey v. Colt Construction & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994).
50. Id.
51. See Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2003).
52. Id.
53. Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005).
54. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 2018).
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female workers taking home a smaller paycheck than male workers doing equal
work. 55 Further, as female employees transition from one job to another, reliance
on prior salary to calculate a new salary means women continue to be subjected
to decades-old pay inequality undermining the “equal pay for equal work”
concept. 56 As much change as the Equal Pay Act allowed, its effect has been
significantly dampened by its malleable “any other factor other than sex”
exception. 57 Relying on the “any other factor other than sex” exception,
employers have defended the use of prior salary in making employment and
compensation decisions under the guise of a factor other than sex. 58 In turn,
female employees are subjected to a perpetual cycle of compounding gender pay
inequality. 59
D. The Equal Pay Act’s Legislative History and the Resulting Congressional
Intent
As a result of these diverging interpretations of the Equal Pay Act and its
affirmative defenses, it is imperative to analyze the legislative history in order
to glean the legislative intent for the Equal Pay Act as a whole. When a
congressional Special Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee of Education
and Labor of the House of Representatives was assigned to the important topic
of wage equality in 1963, several statistical studies were analyzed for providing
support for the Equal Pay Act. 60 In 1963, women were not provided the same
resources to protect their right to equal pay, and “[o]f the 24 ½ million women
in the labor force [at that time], 21 million [did] not belong to a union, and
consequently [were] less able to establish the principle of equal pay for equal
work.” 61 Further, by 1963, twenty-two states had already enacted legislation to
55. Megan Leonhardt, Refusing to Answer this One Job Interview Question Helps Men - but
Hurts Women, MONEY (June 27, 2017), http://money.com/money/4834777/job-interview-ques
tion-past-salary [https://perma.cc/HBD2-2NMH] (“Advocates argue that when past salary is used
to shape compensation at each new job, one discriminatory pay decision leads inevitably to another
one”).
56. Id.
57. Torie Abbott Watkins, The Ghost of Salary Past: Why Salary History Inquiries Perpetuate
the Gender Pay Gap and Should Be Ousted As A Factor Other Than Sex, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1041,
1057 (2018).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. To Prohibit Discrimination, on Account of Sex, In the Payment of Wages by Employers
Engaged in Commerce or in the Production of Goods for Commerce and to Provide for the
Restitution of Wages Lost by Employees by Reason of Any Such Discrimination: Hearing on H.R.
3861 and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 88th Cong. 12 (1963) (statement of Hon. Esther Peterson, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of
Labor).
61. To Prohibit Discrimination, on Account of Sex, In the Payment of Wages by Employers
Engaged in Commerce or in the Production of Goods for Commerce and to Provide for the
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protect women in response to this disparity, with a majority of the female
workers being located in those states. 62 However, while some argued that this
was in fact a state issue, proponents of the Equal Pay Act found that after
“examination of State laws and State enforcement activities” it was “clear that
action by the States is simply not sufficient.” 63 This is because of many finding
the states not going far enough to ensure adequate protections for women in the
workplace, as well as the drastic variations in these protections across the nation.
During the March 15th subcommittee hearings, a large focus surrounded the
economic purpose and benefits that rendered the Equal Pay Act necessary. In
the opening remarks introducing the Bills, the Secretary of Labor, William
Willard Wirtz stated, “This matter is too often cast in terms of prejudice,
propriety, or politics and gallantry, or something of the sort. It isn’t. It is a matter
of exploitation. It is a matter of preserving the competition. It is a matter of good
business.” 64 In 1963, one-third of the work force in America were women. 65 This
proportion was seeing an exponential increase with each passing year. 66 Studies
found that “[a] great many of the women are in the work force because they are
the heads of families, or because they are members of families where the man in
the family is unable to support the family.” 67 These findings contradicted the
misperceived stereotype that commonly circulated that women were just
working to provide their “pin cushion money” or, in other words, extra side
cash. 68 It was not commonly thought of that women were working for their
livelihood. The Secretary of Labor concluded, “It is a matter of preserving a fair
opportunity for someone to exercise a choice which ought to be hers to discharge
what is often a basic, key financial responsibility.” 69 The Senate subcommittee
found the wage disparity to be rooted in a social construct which established a
wage structure across “many segments of American industry . . . based on an
ancient but outmodeled belief that a man, because of his role in society, should
be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the same.” 70
Restitution of Wages Lost by Employees by Reason of Any Such Discrimination: Hearing on H.R.
3861 and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 88th Cong. 9 (1963) (statement of Hon. W. Willard Wirtz, Sec’y).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 10.
66. To Prohibit Discrimination, on Account of Sex, In the Payment of Wages by Employers
Engaged in Commerce or in the Production of Goods for Commerce and to Provide for the
Restitution of Wages Lost by Employees by Reason of Any Such Discrimination: Hearing on H.R.
3861 and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 88th Cong. 10 (1963) (statement of Hon. W. Willard Wirtz, Sec’y).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 109 Cong. Rec. S8914 (daily ed. May 17, 1963).
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The Equal Pay Act of 1963, however, was not intended to entirely eliminate
differential pay. In fact, the head of the Women’s Bureau of the Department of
Labor, Esther Peterson, pointed out the specific “justifiable differentials
stemming from length of service or merit systems [that] would be allowed to
remain.” 71 It is important to note that during the discussions brought about in the
subcommittee, length of service and differing merit were the only two factors
explicitly denoted as exceptions to differing pay among men and women doing
the same labor. 72It was seen that some concessions had to be recognized where
a man’s qualifications might provide for more substantial pay than a female
peer’s pay. 73 The committee never addressed prior pay and whether its use in
setting a pay rate could constitute a justifiable exception to differential pay. The
lack of commentary on the issue is most likely a result of women making up
only thirty-seven percent of the workforce, of which were earning only fiftynine cents to the dollar compared to men.74 Specifically, in 1963, the average
male employee made $28,684.36 while the average female employee made
$16,908—$11,776 less annually. 75 The intent of the Equal Pay Act was to
eliminate this disparity; however, the committee did not and could not have
foreseen this extrinsic factor perpetuating the wage gap as the Act itself was to
solve any remaining residue of inequality. Since the wage gap was so significant
at the time, it would have been nonsensical to even consider prior pay to set
women’s salaries in accordance to the Equal Pay Act because doing so would
accomplish little to nothing in closing the existing gap.
This congressional analysis is supported by two nongovernmental sample
surveys which were introduced to the subcommittee, one authored by the Wall
Street Journal and the other authored by a university. They found that
significant proportions of employers acknowledge the existence of some wage
or salary inequality. About one-third of the employers in one survey admitted
they had a double standard pay scale for male and female office workers. In the
other, about one-fifth of the employers questioned about salary practices

71. To Prohibit Discrimination, on Account of Sex, In the Payment of Wages by Employers
Engaged in Commerce or in the Production of Goods for Commerce and to Provide for the
Restitution of Wages Lost by Employees by Reason of Any Such Discrimination: Hearing on H.R.
3861 and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 88th Cong. 10 (1963) (statement of Hon. Esther Peterson, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of
Labor).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Equal Pay Act of 1963, NAT’L PARK SERV., April 1, 2016, at https://www.nps.gov/articles/
equal-pay-act.htm [https://perma.cc/7A53-2PDB].
75. See, e.g., The Wage Gap Over Time: In Real Dollars, Women See a Continuing Gap,
NAT’L COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, https://www.pay-equity.org/info-time.html [https://perma.cc/BC
46-VXF3] (last visited on Feb. 11, 2019).
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affecting men and women in high-level positions said they did not follow a
uniform practice of paying the same salaries. 76

At the March 15th, 1963 subcommittee hearing, Peterson proceeded to find that
“[t]hese differences in earned income result, though, . . . from a variety of
factors, one of the major ones of which is lack of opportunity for women,
particularly in the better paying jobs.” 77 Thus, it may be argued that once access
to employment opportunities gave way, the wage gap would too diminish. “By
removing this major barrier to women’s economic advancement, it would
diminish the possibilities of using women to force wages down and of taking
advantage of sharp competition for jobs in times of substantial
unemployment.” 78 The gender pay gap would perceivably be corrected as long
as there would be access to higher paying jobs. Yet this is not entirely true, since
the problem persists. This is because Congress could not have predicted for the
gap to linger as a result of employers’ use of a facially neutral application
question. The barrier at the time was the wide-spread facially discriminatory
belief that women’s work was worth less. That was the issue Congress initially
intended to correct; it was not yet foreseen that hiring processes could perpetuate
an intrinsically rooted gender discrimination.
When drafting the Equal Pay Act, Congress also included a Declaration of
Purpose listing various negative consequences associated with lower wages for
women:
The Congress hereby finds that the existence in industries engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce of wage differentials based on sex—
(1) depresses wages and living standards for employees necessary for their
health and efficiency; (2) prevents the maximum utilization of the available
labor resources; (3) tends to cause labor disputes, thereby burdening, affecting,
and obstructing commerce; (4) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in
commerce; and (5) constitutes an unfair method of competition. 79

This Declaration of Purpose provides insight to Congress’s intent
surrounding the Equal Pay Act of 1963. It is clear that the Act focused on the
pay gap’s effects on the economy. Essentially, by paying women less for work,
companies were depressing America’s economy and impeding commerce. The
purpose, while transactional in nature, sheds light to the general impact equal
wages would have on the economy. This was to appeal to corporations as well

76. To Prohibit Discrimination, on Account of Sex, In the Payment of Wages by Employers
Engaged in Commerce or in the Production of Goods for Commerce and to Provide for the
Restitution of Wages Lost by Employees by Reason of Any Such Discrimination: Hearing on H.R.
3861 and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 88th Cong. 12 (1963) (statement of Hon. W. Willard Wirtz, Sec’y).
77. Id. at 31 (statement of Hon. Esther Peterson, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Labor).
78. Id. at 36.
79. Equal Pay Act, § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 88–38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
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because of their tendencies to make hiring decisions on a seemingly
transactional basis. While Congress enacted this legislation with the best
intentions to close the pay inequities between men and women, there are
remaining shortcomings that fail to live up to the Equal Pay Act’s stated purpose.
The Equal Pay Act was enacted fifty-six years ago, and while the wage gap
has significantly narrowed, it still exists and the closing has stagnated over the
years. 80 Currently, for every dollar men earn, women, on average, earn eighty
cents. 81 The pay gap can no longer be blamed on the lack of education or
employment opportunities. 82 This is supported by the evidence that “female
surgeons earn seventy-one percent of what male surgeons earn, and five of the
ten major occupational groups where women lagged the most [in pay] were in
finance.” 83 This trend is not unusual. According to a Wall Street Journal poll, it
found women face even larger pay gaps for what is seen as white-collar
occupations than women with blue-collar occupations. 84
One explanation for the persistent wage gap is that employers have
transitioned from overt gender discrimination to implicit, subconscious
generalizing of the gender. 85 Employers, while not discriminating intentionally,
use an array of factors when considering salary, some of which are intrinsically
disadvantageous for women. 86 Further, while it is reported about forty percent
of companies request for prior pay information, there is a catch-22 that occurs
for women. 87 This is because “women who refuse to disclose what they make
80. The Wage Gap is Stagnant for a Decade, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (2016), at https://nw
lc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Wage-Gap-Stagnant-2016-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6ZD-G2
G3].
81. Terry M. Dworkin et al., Assessing the Progress of Women in Corporate America: The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, 55 AM.BUS. L.J. 721, 722 (2018).
82. Abigail Hess, For the First Time In History, Women are Better Educated Than Their
Husbands—But Men Still Earn More, CNBC (Nov 21, 2017), at https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/
21/women-are-better-educated-than-their-husbands-but-men-still-earn-more.html [https://perma.
cc/4RAH-DWPQ].
83. Dworkin et al., supra note 81, at 731.
84. Janet Adamy & Paul Overberg, Women in Elite Jobs Face Stubborn Pay Gap, WALL ST.
J., (May 17, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/women-in-elite-jobs-face-stubborn-pay-gap-146
3502938 [https://perma.cc/NR3V-C2CP].
85. Dworkin et al., supra note 81, at 758 (“Although overt gender discrimination in the
workplace is now less frequent since the passage of the Civil Rights Act, subconscious biases and
their effects remain. These subtle biases continue to contribute to gender inequality in the
employment context, hindering women’s ability to reach the top ranks of corporate leadership and
their ability to achieve pay equity.”).
86. See id. at 731. These factors can include expectation for production and growth within
company, worth brought to company, expectations for leave i.e. pregnancies—all of which factors
are typically held against women.
87. Megan Leonhardt, Refusing to Answer this One Job Interview Question Helps Men - but
Hurts Women, MONEY (June 27, 2017), http://time.com/money/4834777/job-interview-questionpast-salary [https://perma.cc/W58L-TACF].
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generally earn 1.8% less than women who do give up the details. If a man refuses
to disclose his current salary, however, he gets paid 1.2% more.” 88
A 2018 survey, conducted by WorldatWork, calculated eighty-four percent
of employers rely on prior pay inquiries “a great deal” or “a moderate amount”
when assessing a potential candidate’s salary expectations. 89 Furthermore,
eighty percent of employers that were surveyed reported hiring managers and
recruiters rely on prior pay “a great deal” or “a moderate amount” when
determining an offer that would be acceptable to a potential candidate. 90 These
numbers remain fairly consistent across organizations regardless of the
organization’s size. 91 On the other hand, only ten percent of employers reported
that prior pay is “not at all” used when determining a potential candidate’s
offer. 92 Thus, while prior pay on the surface seems inconsequential, when
women face a persistent history of underpayment, reliance on the same
foundation that causes wage inequality will only perpetuate the problem.
Women are more likely to accept a salary, oblivious that the process used to
reach that number may have been inherently discriminatory. After all, she is not
given a spreadsheet of her peers and their qualifications when being hired. This
issue of the use of prior pay is specifically what the Ninth Circuit addressed in
Rizo v. Yovino.
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE
Aileen Rizo was a math teacher who received both a bachelor’s degree and
master’s degree in math and education. 93 Fresno County, California hires
individuals to act as math consultants and train the area high school teachers on
curricular standards. 94 Ms. Rizo applied for and accepted the County’s official
position as a Math Consultant. 95 The County considers math consultants
managerial employees because, contrary to classroom teachers, they coordinate
the curricular standards across multiple school districts in the County. 96
From 2004 to 2015, when applicants accepted the position of math
consultant, the County set their salaries using an internal policy known as
Standard Operation Procedure #1440 (SOP 1440). 97 This practice eliminated the
88. Id.
89. WORLD AT WORK, QUICK SURVEY ON SALARY HISTORY BANS (U.S.) 9 (2018),
https://www.worldatwork.org/dA/9abc8ad414/salary-history-bans.PDF [https://perma.cc/ZC4TRGCK].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Rizo v. Yovino, No. 1:14-CV-0423-MJS, 2015 WL 9260587, at *3.
94. Id.
95. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 2018).
96. Rizo, 2015 WL 9260587, at *2.
97. Rizo, 887 F.3d. at 457.
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County’s previous practice of considering prospective hires’ experience and
qualifications in setting salaries. 98 Under SOP 1440, new salaries were set by
taking their most recent salaries, adding five percent, and then placing them on
the nearest step in a ten-step salary scheme. 99 The only adjustment to that
salary was either a $600 stipend for a master’s degree or a $1,200 stipend for a
doctorate degree. 100 Under SOP 1440, the average female employee hired as a
math consultant was placed more than two steps below the average male
employee, since most female hires transitioned from lower paying jobs. 101 When
Ms. Rizo accepted the County’s job as a math consultant, she was place on
the lowest prong, step one, which constituted a starting salary of $62,133. 102
In comparison, an individual starting on step ten would receive a salary of
$81,461. 103 Ms. Rizo’s pay was established based solely on her previous pay as
a classroom teacher. 104 She became aware of three other male colleagues starting
salaries being at least $10,000 more than her salary. 105 Further, they were
performing the same job, but she had higher qualifications than these colleagues
had. 106 Ms. Rizo filed a formal internal challenge to the pay disparity. 107 The
County concluded there was no pay disparity in the salary-setting process after
reviewing a compilation of the pay and demographics of employees who held
similar positions. 108 This report indicated that more women had higher paying
salaries than men, however, this was because there were significantly more
female employees in that job, thus the analysis failed to account beyond the
absolute number at each step. 109 Instead, the proper analysis would have looked
at the number of women in relation to the number of men in each pay step. 110
Upon realization of the inherently discriminatory nature of Fresno County’s
salary structure, Ms. Rizo filed suit, believing the pay structure under SOP 1440
was impermissible because of the inherent discriminatory nature that resulted

98. Id. at 457–58. The County has since reverted back to this practice following the initial
filing of this suit.
99. Id. at 457.
100. Id.
101. Rizo, 2015 WL 9260587, at *6. The County’s own data show that the average female
management employee was placed at step 6.3 on the salary scale while the average male employee
was placed at step 8.8. In 2009, the year Rizo was hired, this gap corresponded to at least a $5,000
salary difference on the County’s salary scale.
102. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 458.
103. Rizo, 2015 WL 9260587, at *2.
104. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 458.
105. Id.
106. Rizo, 2015 WL 9260587, at *2.
107. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 458.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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from such use since women have been consistently paid less than men. 111 The
County responded that its exclusive reliance on her prior salary to set pay for her
current job produced a permissible wage gap based on “any other factor other
than sex” under Section 206(d)(1)(iv). 112 The County supported its policy of
basing employee pay on prior salary by presenting non-discriminatory business
reasons for using such process. These reasons include that the use of prior pay
to set starting salary (i) is objective; (ii) encourages candidates to leave other
jobs because candidates will always receive a five percent pay increase over their
prior salary; (iii) prevents favoritism; and (iv) is a judicious use of taxpayer
dollars. 113
The district court reasoned that “a pay structure based exclusively on prior
wages,” such as SOP 1440, “is so inherently fraught with the risk—indeed, here,
the virtual certainty—that it will perpetuate a discriminatory wage disparity
between men and women that it cannot stand.” 114 In light of the “across-theboard pay disparity between male and female educators,” the district court
explained that salary systems based exclusively upon prior pay “will perpetrate
that disparity” and subvert the remedial objectives of the Equal Pay Act. 115
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit found that under circuit
precedent, past pay could constitute an affirmative defense for an otherwise
illegal pay disparity under certain circumstances. An employer could “base a
pay differential on prior salary so long as it showed” that it had “used the factor
reasonably in light of its stated purpose and its other practices,” and that it
“effectuate[d] some business policy.” 116 As a result, the panel directed the district
court to consider petitioner’s rationales for its exclusive reliance on Ms. Rizo’s
prior salary and determine whether they justify the evident pay disparity. 117 The
decision was instead appealed to the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc.
There, a majority of the judges agreed with Rizo that petitioner’s sole
reliance on Ms. Rizo’s former pay to set her salary did not constitute an
affirmative defense within the meaning of Section 206(d)(1)(iv).118 In
addressing the issue, the Ninth Circuit looked to the language of the statute. The
Oxford English Dictionary provides a definition of the phrase “any other” that
conveys its reference to a thing “specified or understood contextually.” 119
111. Id.
112. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 458.
113. Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc granted, 869 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2017), and on reh’g en banc, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018).
114. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 458.
115. Rizo v. Yovino, No 1:14-cv-0423-MJS, 2015 WL 13236875, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
2015).
116. Rizo, 854 F.3d at 1166.
117. Id. at 1167.
118. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460, 467.
119. Other, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004).
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Congress’s use of this phrase becomes important when looking at the statute as
a whole, namely, the phrase appears in a list of affirmative defenses. The
defenses all carry the similarity of directly pertaining to work performance, such
as experience and quality of work production. The court addressed Noscitur a
sociis, which “stands for the principle that words are to be understood by the
company they keep.” 120 Ejusdem generis further exercised this principle to
general provisions following specific lists. 121 The Supreme Court follows this
logic as “[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory
enumeration, the general words are [usually] construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words.” 122 It is essential to look at the statute’s overarching theme and mission
to understand what the factors are trying to admit or protect against. 123 The first
three listed affirmative defenses provide for an employer to pay more to an
employee who has greater experience to offer, whether that be greater skill-set
or years on the job. 124 As a result, the fourth affirmative defense should likewise
also be limited to specific job-related factors. 125
In looking at the legislative intent, the majority believed that Section
206(d)(1)(iv) can only excuse a pay differential when that differential is based
on “legitimate” factors. Such factors “must be job related,” which means they
must be “measure[s] of work experience, ability, performance, or any other jobrelated quality.” 126 Thus, prior salary, standing alone, is not a “legitimate”
factor. 127 The court further explained that while prior salary might bear a “rough
relationship” to legitimate factors like education or ability, the relationship is
attenuated and the use of prior salary “may well operate to perpetuate the wage
disparities prohibited under the Act.” 128 The majority directed that “[r]ather than
use a second-rate surrogate that likely masks continuing inequities,” the
employer must “point directly to the underlying factors for which prior salary is
a rough proxy” in order to “prove its wage differential is justified.” 129 The court
reasoned that the purpose of the Act was to “eliminate long-existing ‘endemic’
sex-based wage disparities.” 130 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals therefore
found it “inconceivable” that Congress “would create an exception for basing

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Brief in Opposition at 24, Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019) (No. 18-272).
Id.
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1086 (2015).
See Brief in Opposition, supra note 120, at 24.
Id. at 25–26.
Id.
Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 460.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2019]

WAGING WAR AGAINST PRIOR PAY

129

new hires’ salaries on those very disparities.” 131 To permit consideration of
salary history as a factor alone or in combination with other factors would allow
employers to “capitalize on the persistence of the wage gap and perpetuate that
gap ad infinitum—would be contrary to the text and history of the Equal Pay
Act, and would vitiate the very purpose for which the Act stands.” 132 The Ninth
Circuit thus concluded that prior pay could not be considered a “factor other than
sex” and is impermissible to use by employers because of the discriminatory
nature of the factor.
In the concurrences, the judges felt that relying solely on prior pay as a factor
was a violation of the Equal Pay Act; however, it could conceivably be used as
a single factor that is considered with other appropriate factors. 133
III. THE EXISITING CIRCUIT SPLIT SURROUNDING THE PERMISSIBILITY OF
PRIOR PAY USAGE
Currently, circuit courts have taken various stances in interpreting the fourth
exception enumerated in the Equal Pay Act: “any factor other than sex.” As a
result, there have been inconsistencies in court decisions when women bring
claims regarding the discriminating nature of salaries set in reliance on their
prior pay. In general, there are three different responses to employers’ use of
prior pay as a factor other than sex: The Ninth Circuit previously found that
employers should never consider prior pay under any circumstance,134 the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits view prior pay as a factor other than sex, 135 and the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits believe that prior pay should not be the sole factor
when considering a starting salary. 136
Prior to the Rizo v. Yovino decision, the Ninth Circuit had previously held
that prior pay constituted a “factor other than sex” upon which a wage
differential may be based under the Equal Pay Act’s “catchall” exception 137 set
forth in 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 138 Rizo overturned this understanding and as a
result overturned the precedent on the matter, Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.
In Kouba, a class of women sued Allstate for sex discrimination due to their

131. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460.
132. Id. at 456–67.
133. Id. at 469 (McKeown, C.J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. See Wernsing v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005).
136. Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 F.App’x 500, 508 (10th Cir. 2003); Irby v. Bittick,
44 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding reliance on salary history alone was an Equal Pay Act
violation).
137. There is a broad construction of this final exception that some have seen as permitting
courts to expand the exceptions to suit the employers when not being facially discriminatory. See
supra note 45.
138. Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
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practice of setting their starting minimum pay using prior salary as a factor. 139
As a result of this, women were disproportionately paid a lower rates than their
male equals. 140 Allstate responded that prior salary is a “factor other than sex”
within the meaning of the statutory exception. 141 The district court entered
summary judgment against Allstate, reasoning that (1) because so many
employers paid discriminatory salaries in the past, the court would presume that
a female agent’s prior salary was based on her gender unless Allstate presented
evidence to rebut that presumption, and (2) absent such a showing (which
Allstate did not attempt to make), prior salary is not a factor other than sex.142
The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, finding that:
The Equal Pay Act concerns business practices. It would be nonsensical to
sanction the use of a factor that rests on some consideration unrelated to
business. An employer thus cannot use a factor which causes a wage differential
between male and female employees absent an acceptable business reason.
Conversely, a factor used to effectuate some business policy is not prohibited
simply because a wage differential results. 143

The 1982 decision reversed the district court’s progressive finding and
reverted back to the conservative holding that the Equal Pay Act entrusts
employers, not judges, with making the decisions that will accomplish their
business objectives. 144 The court does not and should not have any referee role
and thus does not have any authority to give guidance on the proper judicial
inquiry when there is a lack of direct evidence of discriminatory intent. 145 The
court found this to be a “pragmatic standard, which protects against abuse yet
accommodates employer discretion,” 146 and thus permits employers to base
compensation on salary history alone, provided the employer can show that use
of salary history “effectuates some business policy,” and it is used
“reasonably.” 147 This conservative position was a result of the generation’s
belief that the government should play a minimal role in corporations. After all,
judges do not typically have the same business savvy as a CEO, let alone the
fundamental knowledge of running a business.
Rizo v. Yovino abrogated this decision and in doing so, took an approach that
offered the most narrow interpretation of the “any other factor other than sex”
defense than any other circuit had before. In Rizo, the Ninth Circuit determined
that prior pay could not be considered a factor for setting starting salaries, alone
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 875.
Id.
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
Id.; see Cty. of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170–71, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2248–49 (1981).
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
Id.
Id.
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or in conjunction with other employment factors. 148 This decision effectively
eliminated the trend of asking for salary history during employment procedures
in the Ninth Circuit and is being recognized by companies across America. 149
A.

The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits

There are circuits whose decisions similarly align with the Ninth Circuit
following the Rizo decision. The circuits include the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits. In Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc.,, the Tenth Circuit found that the
employer’s consideration of prior pay alone does not qualify as an exception of
“a factor other than sex” as required by the Equal Pay Act. 150 In Angove, the
plaintiff worked at Williams-Sonoma from 1991 until being fired in 2000. 151
While employed at Williams-Sonoma, Angove worked as a sales associate and
proceeded to be promoted to store manager at two different store locations. 152
Following his termination, Angove filed this lawsuit against Williams-Sonoma
contending that his previous employer’s pay scale infringed against the Equal
Pay Act. 153 Angove argued that because another store manager, MacKenna,
made $12,000 more annually than Angove, he was being discriminated against
on the basis of sex. 154 Williams-Sonoma based Mackenna’s starting salary on a
number of factors, as they did with all of their employees. 155 Williams-Sonoma’s
decision to match MacKenna’s prior salary was based on her extensive retail
experience, “substantial connection to the community, the respect she
commanded within the Tulsa shopping center, and the recommendation of the
owner of the shopping center.” 156 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under
the Equal Pay Act, “[e]xperience is an acceptable factor other than sex if not
used as a pretext for differentiation because of gender,” and that prior pay may
only be considered as a factor in setting a salary when considered alongside these
other factors. 157 Since Williams-Sonoma relied on various job-performance

148. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460.
149. Yuki Noguchi, More Employers Avoid Legal Minefield By Not Asking About Pay History,
NPR (May 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/03/608126494/more-employers-avoid-legalminefield-by-not-asking-about-pay-history [https://perma.cc/F3TU-X435], (“Some companies
aren’t waiting for the legal questions to settle: Amazon, Wells Fargo, American Express, Cisco,
Google and Bank of America all recently changed hiring policies to eliminate questions about pay
history.”).
150. Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 F.App’x 500, 508 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The EPA only
precludes an employer from relying solely upon a prior salary to justify pay disparity”).
151. Id. at 503.
152. Id. at 502.
153. Id. at 504.
154. Id. at 507.
155. Angove, 70 F. App’x at 508.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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related factors, their employment hiring criteria was not in violation of the Equal
Pay Act. 158
Similarly, in Irby v. Bittick, the Eleventh Circuit articulated that “an
employer may not overcome the burden of proof on the affirmative defense of
relying on ‘any other factor other than sex’ by resting on prior pay alone.” 159 In
Irby, Barbara Irby filed suit against Monroe County, Georgia and John Bittick,
the Sheriff of Monroe County, in his official capacity as sheriff. 160 While
working as a county criminal investigator, two city appointed investigators,
Robert Jones and Ronald Evans, began also working as investigators in the
county as a result of a job transfer. 161 Even though their job descriptions
remained the same as before—and they had the same job description as Irby—
Jones and Evans were actually paid more by the county than they had been by
the city. 162 This is because in switching over from city positions to county
positions, the two male employees were given an initial base salary equal to the
sum of their city base salary plus overtime. 163 This equated to $23,987.50 in
1989 and $27,868.10 in 1993—a significantly higher compensation than what
Irby received, which was $15,757.00 in 1989 and $18,519.80 in 1993. 164
In considering Irby’s suit, the court addressed the Equal Pay Act’s “any
other factor other than sex” exception, finding that “such factors include unique
characteristics of the same job; . . . an individual’s experience, training or ability;
or . . . special exigent circumstances connected with the business.” 165 The
Eleventh Circuit held that the county “cannot defend paying Jones and Evans
more than Irby simply because of the pay schedule of Jones and Evans’s
previous employer.” 166 Ultimately, the court found that “an Equal Pay Act
defendant may successfully raise the affirmative defense of ‘any other factor
other than sex’ if he proves that he relied on prior salary and experience in setting
a ‘new’ employee’s salary . . .” as seen in this case because the prior pay would
be used as a mixed-motive. 167 However, the court proceeded to explain that
salary history alone, in this case, would not be sufficient to warrant a pay
differential because “[i]f prior salary alone were a justification, the exception

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 953.
Id.
Id.
Irby, 44 F.3d at 953 n.3.
Id. at 955.
Id.
Id.
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would swallow up the rule and inequality in pay among genders would be
perpetuated.” 168
Thus, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have found that prior pay alone cannot
determine a salary but may be considered in collaboration with other legitimate
business considerations such as experience.
B.

The Seventh and Eighth Circuits

The Seventh and Eighth Circuits disagree with the Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits’ findings and have instead concluded prior pay may be
considered a “factor other than sex.” In Wernsing v. Ill. Dep’t of Human
Services, the Seventh Circuit held that so long as sex is not a factor in
determining salaries, there is no Equal Pay Act violation when considering the
employee’s wage history. 169 Jenny Wernsing sought for the Seventh Circuit to
reverse their previous decisions and to invalidate the Department of Human
Services of Illinois’s reliance on prior pay to set lateral employees’ new
salaries. 170 Following Wernsing’s acceptance of an Internal Security
Investigator II position in the department’s Office of the Inspector General, her
starting monthly salary was $2,478.118, which was calculated using Wernsing’s
prior monthly salary of $1,935 while employed as a Special Agent with the
Southern Illinois Enforcement Group. 171 As a result of the various prior salaries
received by lateral employees, there was no uniform pay system used. 172
Subsequently, Charles Bingaman, who was hired contemporaneously with
Wernsing, received a substantially higher starting monthly salary of $3,739 as a
result of his higher prior salary. 173 The Seventh Circuit even noted that
“Wernsing and Bingaman do the same work but at substantially different pay as
a result of this process for determining initial salaries. Annual raises preserve
the relative gap until employees reach the maximum of the pay scale. Bingaman
will top out years before Wernsing does.” 174 Although Wernsing started at a
salary less than Bingaman, her percentage pay increase was higher at thirty

168. Id. (citing Price v. Lockheed Space Operations Co., 856 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988);
Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570–71 (11th Cir. 1988)) (“Appellees cannot defend
paying Jones and Evans more than Irby simply because of the pay schedule of Jones and Evans’s
previous employer. Therefore, we reject appellees’ reliance on prior salary as a separate
justification for the pay differential.”).
169. Wernsing v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., , 427 F.3d 466, 471 (7th Cir. 2005).
170. Id. at 468 (recognizing that the Seventh Circuit has already decided similar cases that
found prior pay to be acceptable under the EPA).
171. Id. at 467.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Wersing, 427 F.3d at 467.
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percent compared to Bingaman’s ten percent. 175 The court failed to examine the
validity of the employer’s stated reason for the practice. 176
According to the Seventh Circuit, Congress intended the “any other factor
other than sex” exception to be read broadly, as the hiring criteria “need not be
‘related to the requirements of the particular position in question,’ nor must it
even be business-related.”177 The court proceeded to analyze other Circuits’
approach to looking at Congressional intent when reading the Equal Pay Act and
concluded that Congress has the power and duty to explicitly bar or permit
actions. Thus, the statutes should be read literally and unspoken “intent” should
not be inferred from statements in committee reports or on the floor. 178 Congress
made the decision not to restrict that fourth affirmative defense; therefore, the
defense should not be limited by the courts without explicit direction to do
so. The Seventh Circuit deduced that the Equal Pay Act “forbids sex
discrimination, an intentional wrong, while markets are impersonal and have
no intent.” 179 The Seventh Circuit essentially mocked and discredited the Ninth,
Tenth and Eleventh Circuit’s divergent holdings by finding that their reasoning
“rests on an ‘intent’ that, if not manufactured by the judges rather than
discovered by digging through legislative debates, lacks any footing in enacted
texts.” 180 The Equal Pay Act itself only “asks whether the employer has a
reason other than sex—not whether it has a ‘good’ reason.” 181 Sticking with
their strict interpretation of the Equal Pay Act, the Seventh Circuit found that
“Congress has not authorized federal judges to serve as personnel managers for
America’s employers.” 182 According to the court, like Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws, the Equal Pay Act does not permit a court to assess the
reasonableness of the employer’s stated business purpose. 183 Thus, the Equal
Pay Act does not prevent employers from basing starting salaries on prior pay. 184
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit found in Taylor v. White that unequal pay for
identical work under identical conditions is not unlawful when the pay is based
on a “salary retention policy.” 185 Esther S. Taylor worked as a civilian employee

175. Id.
176. See generally Wernsing v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005).
177. Id. at 470 (quoting Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994)).
178. Id. at 469. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566–68 (1988); Brill v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005).
179. Wersing, 427 F.3d at 469.
180. Id. at 470 (“That many women spend more years in child-rearing than do men thus implies
that women’s market wages will be lower on average, but such a difference does not show
discrimination.”).
181. Id. at 468.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 470.
184. Wersing, 427 F.3d at 470.
185. Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 717, 718–19 (8th Cir. 2003).
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at the Army’s Pine Bluff, Arkansas Arsenal. 186 While working at the Army’s
Arsenal in Pine Bluff, Taylor worked together with two male employees,
Theodis Thornton and Willie Early, and a female employee, Linda Jones. 187
Thorton, Early, Jones, and Taylor “performed identical work under identical
conditions.” 188 However, the male employees were still set at a higher pay scale
than the female employees and, as a result, made more money for performing
the identical work. 189
The Army claimed the rationale for such a salary retention policy was to
retain skilled employees during periods of time when their services are not
required by preventing job loss and allowing employees to perform less
demanding, lower grade work without suffering a reduction in grade or salary,
and thus had no correlation to sex. 190 Taylor argued that the policy was loose
and subjective, and it was not properly asserted as there was a “sloppiness and
informality” to the Army’s implementation. 191 The Eighth Circuit found that “if
it is permissible to rely upon a salary retention policy, the unwritten nature of
the policy or the presence of subjectivity or informality in the structure or
administration of the policy cannot, standing alone, support an inference of
discrimination.” 192 While salary inquiries may result in wage decisions based on
factors unrelated to an individual’s qualifications for a particular job, the court
reasoned such policies are not necessarily gender biased. 193 The court thus
concluded that while
an employer might apply a salary retention policy in a discriminatory fashion or
use such a policy as a vehicle to perpetuate historically unequal wages caused
by past discrimination, these potential abuses do not provide valid bases to adopt
a per se rule that declares all salary retention practices inherently
discriminatory. 194

Thus, the Eighth Circuit found that the catchall exception applies to any business
decisions that are not facially discriminatory. It would be impossible to account
for all the potential underlying discriminatory factors affecting women, thus the
Equal Pay Act should be read literally as “any factor other than sex.”

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 712.
Id.
Id. at 713.
Id.
Taylor, 321 F.3d at 716.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id. at 718.
Id.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY AFFIRM THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
HOLDING IN RIZO V. YOVINO
It took until 1971 and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s advocacy to certify
women as a recognized class of people, deserving of equal protections and equal
rights as those that previously only belonged to men. Rizo had that same
potential to be beacon of hope in the long journey of women’s rights when the
petitioner filed an appeal from the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision. The
Supreme Court did grant certiorari but did not hear arguments. Instead, they
vacated and remanded the decision on unrelated procedural grounds. This was a
mistake. The wage gap will not close until this issue is decided once and for all.
Rizo v. Yovino will be back. There will be a Ninth Circuit rehearing and likely
an appeal from that decision. The Supreme Court will then be faced with the
question: Does prior pay discriminate on the basis of sex? The Court would then
determine if there is in fact a limit to what has been previously seen by some
circuits as the catchall exception, to which any business-related decision can
apply.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Reasoning to Vacate and Remand Rizo v. Yovino

The U.S. Supreme Court was poised to tackle the use of salary history
inquires and settle the circuit split once and for all following its grant of certiorari
of Rizo v. Yovino. However, the Court failed to rule on the fundamental dispute
at hand. Instead, the Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit decision
because Judge Reinhardt, the author of the majority opinion, passed away eleven
days before the decision was officially published.195 The Ninth Circuit
previously addressed Judge Reinhardt’s passing in the published decision,
noting: “Prior to his death, Judge Reinhardt fully participated in this case and
authored this opinion. The majority opinion and all concurrences were final, and
voting was completed by the en banc court prior to his death.” 196
The Supreme Court concluded it was procedurally improper to include
Justice Reinhardt’s vote in the count because judges are permitted to change
their votes up until the time the decision is released to the public. 197 According
to the Court, authorizing Judge Reinhardt’s decision to stand violates judicial
policy because it effectively permitted a deceased judge to still exercise the
judicial power of the United States even after his death. 198 The Court resounded
that federal judges are “appointed for life, not for eternity.” 199
Further, without Judge Reinhardt’s vote, there was not a majority to support
the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision due to only five judges supporting the
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 710 (2019).
Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 456 n.* (9th Cir. 2018).
Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 709 (2019).
Id. at 710.
Id.
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decision out of the remaining ten judges still living. Additionally, the Court
resonated concern that Reinhardt’s decision was deemed the majority decision,
thereby establishing the mandatory precedent in the Ninth Circuit. 200 Because
the other five judges wrote only as concurrences for various reasons, the Court
found it impossible to determine what outcome would have resulted without
Judge Reinhardt authoring the majority opinion. 201 Thus, the Court found the
only feasible solution to vacate and remand the Ninth Circuit decision. In doing
so, the Court failed to provide any dicta or direction regarding the core issue of
prior pay under the Equal Pay Act, which continues to divide the country’s
courts. 202
It is likely the Ninth Circuit will readdress and author a new decision in Rizo.
The decision can be expected to uphold at least some level of rejection of
reliance on prior pay under the Equal Pay Act. There is no time estimate for how
long it will be before the Ninth Circuit once again addresses these issues;
however, as it currently stands, employers’ use of salary history inquiries is once
again permissible unless there is a state or local legislation to the contrary. Since
some of the concurrences expressed concern with how far the majority went with
its complete ban on considering prior pay, the new decision may show more
restraint in interpreting the Equal Pay Act. 203 Another potential outcome is the
decision remains the same in the Ninth Circuit’s respect for Judge Reinhardt’s
majority opinion on the matter. At this stage, it will most likely be some time
before the Supreme Court addresses the employers’ use of salary history, so the
current circuit split is likely to remain unless there is action from Congress.
B.

The Future of Prior Pay in the Supreme Court

Regardless of the outcome on the Ninth Circuit’s rehearing of Rizo v.
Yovino, there are a couple of outcomes that may occur if the Supreme Court
eventually rehears an appeal on this issue. First, the Supreme Court may affirm
the previous Ninth Circuit decision in Rizo v. Yovino. This would drastically
change the landscape of the Equal Pay Act as that decision would reject the
consideration of prior pay under any circumstance, including in compilation
with other work-related factors. No other circuit besides the Ninth Circuit has
yet interpreted the use of prior pay to this restrictive of a manner. Another stance
the Supreme Court could take is that prior pay cannot be used exclusively to
determine a starting salary. This would align more with the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits. 204 This would force companies to use other business-related factors
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Yovino, 139 S. Ct. at 710.
203. See Rizo v. Yovino, 857 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018).
204. See Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 F.App’x 500 (10th Cir. 2003); Irby v. Bittick,
44 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 1995).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

138

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:113

such as work experience when applying prior pay as a factor to base starting
salary. The Supreme Court could also choose to reject this argument, and find
for an expansive view of the “any factor other than sex” exception. This would
revert the courts back to the understanding that only overt sexism can constitute
compensation discrimination.
The petitioners, Yovino and the employer, in the appeal to the Supreme
Court in Rizo, implore salary history could be considered a legitimate factor
other than sex. 205 Based on the circuit split, the Supreme Court has an interest in
settling the law to ensure consistency for men and women advocating for equal
pay as well for employers, so that they have guidelines to follow. 206 While some
states have embraced the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, others have gone in the opposite
direction and have passed legislation that strictly forbids local governments from
enacting their own rules banning the use of prior pay. 207 As a result, there is even
more turmoil in interpreting the ability to rely on prior pay when setting a salary.
This reinforces the Court’s grave mistake to not address the use of prior pay in
relation to the Equal Pay Act.
There is also support for why prior pay can be considered a gender-neutral
practice. In a competitive market such as the trucking industry, employers might
simply want to ensure their wages are competitive in the ever-changing
markets. 208 Further, prior pay could be used to ensure an efficient hiring process
in that employers ask about prior salary “not in order to discriminate,” but
because “[t]hey don’t want to waste the time of a candidate who’s seeking a
higher salary than they can offer.” 209 This would permit an employer not to
waste valuable time and resources on a candidate they simply cannot afford.
Further, the ban on salary history questions might actually have negative effects
on closing the wage gap. This is because employers who are no longer able to
ask about prior salary might conclude a female candidate would accept less

205. Brief for The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. at 9, 10–11,
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019) (No. 18-272).
206. Id. at 10, 17.
207. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 123.1384(4) (2019) (“A local governmental body shall not
adopt, enforce, or administer an ordinance, local policy, or local resolution regulating information
an employer or potential employer must request, require, or exclude on an application for
employment or during the interview process from an employee or a potential employee.”); WIS.
STAT. § 103.36(3)(a) (2019) (“No city, village, town, or county may enact or enforce an ordinance
prohibiting an employer from soliciting information regarding the salary history of prospective
employees.”).
208. Brief for The Chamber of Commerce, supra note 205 at 11.
209. Yuki Noguchi, Proposals Aim To Combat Discrimination Based On Salary History, NPR
(May 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/30/528794176/proposals-aim-to-combat-discrimina
tion-based-on-salary-history [https://perma.cc/QK23-BR3M].
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money than a male, since females make less on average. 210 As University of
Virginia economist, Jennifer Doleac, asserted:
It seems like the general social impulse is, “We don’t like employers using
particular information, so we’ll tell them they can’t use it anymore and assume
that’s the end of the conversation, . . . [b]ut if they cared enough about it to ask
it to begin with, they probably care about it enough to try to guess.” 211

As a result, by asking about prior pay, it could be in fact the employer doing its
best to avoid gender discrimination.
In analyzing the Ninth Court decision of Rizo, the petitioner, Yovino as the
employer, argued that the court completely rejected the plain text meaning of
the statute. The exception clearly lays out that “any other factor other than sex”
may be permitted by companies to use when establishing a starting salary.
Congress intended to end pay inequality based on sex. This fourth affirmative
defense reinforces that. The Equal Pay Act bars any employer to discriminate on
the basis of sex, but Congress has not in any way limited the business reasoning
that may be asserted when hiring so long as it is not reliant on gender. The
business reasoning, when put in objective light, needs to be permitted to ensure
that company practice is not infringed upon. Objective reasoning does not
implicate gender discrimination within the Equal Pay Act as sex was not the
controlling factor. Thus, the petitioner argued that the Ninth Circuit sitting en
banc was incorrect to conclude that prior pay is impermissible.
The respondents, Rizo in this case, previously argued that certiorari should
not be granted. However, this was because Rizo had already won at the time.
She did not want to risk the potential overruling of her victory, which became
the ultimate result due to the remand of the case. This should not stop Rizo from
continuing to pursue justice, both at the regional level and at the national level.
Women should be granted the right to a non-discriminatory pay structure that
relies solely on her skill and merit instead of outside factors outside of her
control.
The Ninth Circuit sitting en banc was correct in its decision for multiple
reasons. The Ninth Circuit correctly found that an employer cannot pay a female
employee less than her male equal solely because of her prior salary at a different
job with a different employer. Such a policy cannot constitute “a differential
based on any other factor other than sex” in alignment with the context of 29
U.S.C. Section 206(d)(1)(iv). The Ninth Circuit’s holding correctly interprets
the text, history, and logic of the Equal Pay Act. 212 It is proper statutory canon

210. Noam Scheiber, If a Law Bars Asking Your Past Salary, Does It Help or Hurt?, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/business/economy/salary-historylaws.html [https://perma.cc/22XC-UK69].
211. Id.
212. Brief of Respondent at 23, Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019) (No. 18-272).
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to read a statute as a whole in order to understand the objectives of the Act. 213
In reading the affirmative defense together, it is clear that all four must be
construed as job-related factors; anything beyond that would be outside the
intended scope of Congress. 214 Further, prior pay cannot be considered a jobrelated factor because it exposes nothing about performance and can be
completely unrelated if transitioning to a new line of work. 215 The Supreme
Court was wrong to remand this case instead of upholding its findings.
The respondent at the time had argued that if the Equal Pay Act would be
read as broadly as the petitioner requested, then the statute would essentially
have no purpose. 216 This is because the fourth affirmative defense could be
construed to accept any decision by the company so long as a reason for that
decision is provided. This creates an impossible hurdle for victims of
discriminatory pay to overcome. Under no circumstances, albeit accepted
reasoning such as seniority, should a woman who has greater experience and
education receive pay that is less than her equals. Reliance on prior pay can
cause this result, as it did in Ms. Rizo’s case. Even the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) appeared on behalf of Ms. Rizo and presented
its Compliance Manual, which “constitute[s] a ‘body of experience and
informed judgment’ to which [courts] may resort for guidance.” 217 In its brief to
the Ninth Circuit, the EEOC articulated that “because exclusive reliance on prior
salary institutionalizes the disparity between what men and women earn on
average, the practice undermines the purpose of the EPA.” 218 Based on this
understanding that women historically are paid lower salaries, it is inadmissible
to rely on prior pay when it potentially constitutes an implicit bias in the first
place. This is regardless of the intentions of the employer in using this prior pay.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation should have been upheld based on the
language, legislative history, and the endemic underpayment of women in the
workplace.
V. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
As the Supreme Court continues to await the time they may decide the use
of salary history inquiries, there is a chance that the legislature may definitively
act before then. In the Paycheck Fairness Act, sponsored by Rep. Rosa DeLauro
(D-CT) and her colleagues, Congress hopes to further limit the pay disparities
by banning the use of salary history inquiries during job-screenings, interviews,

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 26.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 212, at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
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and at any point of the hiring process. 219 The Paycheck Fairness Act also
proposes to protect women against retaliation from their employers for
discussing their salaries with others as well as requires employers to prove that
pay disparities exist for legitimate, job-related reasons instead of the current
standard of giving employers leeway in determining pay for unclear “business
reasons.” 220
This is not the first time the Paycheck Fairness Act has graced Congress’s
floors. In fact, it is the eleventh time being introduced.221 Each time in the past
two decades, the Paycheck Fairness Act, while well received by the public, fades
from the attention of Congress after introduction. 222 The potential reason? While
there is high public approval for the Paycheck Fairness Act, it is not well
received by corporations. 223 In March 2017, about two dozen businesses wrote
President Trump to revoke similarly structured regulations requiring greater
transparency for workplace pay that were enacted in 2016 by President
Obama. 224 A few months later, President Trump complied. 225 This new
Paycheck Fairness Act that was introduced in January 2019 aims to reverse
President Trump’s actions and reinstate this previous rule. 226
According to an American Association of University Women study in 2013,
women are compensated 6.6 percent less than their male counterparts at their
first jobs, “even after considering factors such as job location, occupation,
college major, and number of hours worked.” 227 The Paycheck Fairness Act
would address the problem in three key ways. 228 It would mandate employers to
publicize pay data to the EEOC, permitting the agency to ascertain any potential
discrimination. For example, the EEOC would be able to pinpoint when “women
at a certain company consistently earn less and get promoted less than men in
similar positions.” 229 The Paycheck Fairness Act would also prohibit employers
from requiring employees to keep their salaries confidential, so women would
be able to inquire how much their colleagues earn without fear of retaliation. 230
219. The Paycheck Fairness Act, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, (Jan. 2019)
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/workplace/fair-pay/the-paycheck-fair
ness-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WXN-YYR7].
220. Id.
221. Alexia Fernández Campbell, How Democrats Plan to Shrink the Gender Pay Gap, VOX,
(Feb. 12, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/12/18205182/paycheck-fairness-act-gen
der-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/LW8U-B933].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Campbell, supra note 221.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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Finally, it would ban the use of salary history when determining pay. 231
There are a couple potential outcomes regarding the Paycheck Fairness Act.
First, the Act could pass both the House and Senate and become law with the
president’s signature, in which case businesses have direct orders never to rely
on prior pay. Second, the Bill once more becomes lost among countless other
bills waiting to garner support. The later would result in still more discrepancies
in how to incorporate prior pay into the hiring process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Equal Pay Act has left many courts in disagreement over how to handle
salary history inquisitions. As a result, employers remain without direction at
the cost of explicit equality for female employees. While women’s rights in the
workplace have improved significantly, and the pay gap has essentially been cut
in half since the Equal Pay Act’s enactment, it is predicted that the pay gap will
not completely close until 2059. 232 Clearly there is still a long way to go for
women’s equality.
Based on the Equal Pay Act’s history, it is clear that the intent was to provide
women access to the same salaries as their male counterparts. There is a long
history of undervaluing a woman’s work. This is, and has been, unjustifiable.
Since being enacted in 1963, the Equal Pay Act has contributed to the narrowing
of the wage discrepancies; however, a twenty-cent gap still remains. This can
most likely be attributed to the expansive nature of the fourth affirmative
defense, “any factor other than sex.” This exception permits employers to base
pay on any business reason it deems appropriate. However, because of the
intrinsically discriminatory nature of the use of prior pay, salary history inquiries
should be prohibited. This is because of the long-lasting history of women being
underpaid. By relying on prior salary, there is simply a perpetuation of this issue,
contrary to the intent of Congress when enacting the Equal Pay Act. Several
circuits have reached different conclusions on the reliance of prior pay, however.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to step in and hear Rizo v. Yovino.
They refused to address the pressing matter, and women will remain trapped by
the prior pay stranglehold until the laws enacted to protect them are read with
that same intent. When the Supreme Court finally responds to the circuit split,
there are a few potential outcomes. The Court could decide to narrowly decide
the issue, in that prior pay should not be the sole factor used when determining
pay. This would not be such a drastic decision as there are several circuits
mentioned above that have interpreted the Equal Pay Act to mean the same thing.
231. Campbell, supra note 221.
232. Women’s Median Earnings as a Percent of Men’s Median Earnings, 1960-2017 (Fulltime, Year-round Workers) with Projection for Pay Equity in 2059, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY
RESEARCH, (Sept. 2018), https://iwpr.org/publications/pay-equity-projection-1960-2017/
[https://perma.cc/944S-2VBP].
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The Court could instead take a narrow interpretation of the law and find that
“any other factor other than sex” should be only read as business-related
qualities such as experience and merit. That decision would align itself with the
previous Ninth Circuit stance as well and the legislation that is continuously
trying to be passed. This would be seen as accepting the climate of the era, in
the sense that the public is the main advocate behind such a proposal. The
climate of the era has in fact been known for permitting monumental decisions
that have ended discrimination previously. 233 The time has come for the courts
to take a more definite stance on gender inequality in the workplace. The gap
remains visible even fifty-five years after the Equal Pay Act’s enactment. Thus,
there needs to be even greater progression if women will ever have the same
footing as their male equals in the workplace. This will not be the end of Rizo v.
Yovino, and if it is, there will be another case just like it to come out of the
framework. With twenty cents still remaining to close the wage gap, equality is
still a long way away. Another woman, in no time at all, will be told a familiar
tale: her work is still not worth that of her male peers. That case deserves to be
heard. Women deserve to be heard.
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